Abstract: Implementations of Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) systems are often incomplete with respect to the theories they are intended to implement. This paper studies two issues that arise in dealing with these incomplete implementations. First, the notion of \satis ability function" (the analogue of uni cation) is formally de ned, and the question of which such functions are reasonable is studied. Second, techniques are given, based on the notion of satis ability function, for formally (proof-theoretically) specifying an intended CLP theory or characterizing an existing CLP system. Such proof-theoretic characterizations have applications in proving soundness and completeness results, and proving properties of programs. Notions from substructural logic and the notion of Henkinness of the theory are shown to be important here.
Introduction
The semantics of Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) languages is now well-understood. Implementations of CLP languages, however, are often not complete with respect to their intended theories; that is, there are goals G such that G is satis able in the intended theory, but the CLP system cannot discover G to be satis able. In this paper, I study the foundations of such incomplete implementations, by giving a recursion-theoretic, rather than model-theoretic, basis for CLP operational semantics. Based on this work, I then study proof-theoretic techniques for specifying the intended theory of a CLP language, or giving characterizations of the actual theory implemented by a CLP language.
A simple example shows that some CLP implementations are necessarily incomplete. Consider a rst order language, structure and theory in which the terms encode untyped lambdaexpressions, and in which disequality 6 = holds between two terms i they are not extensionally equivalent. The theory and structure can be made to meet Ja ar and Lassez' original conditions JL87] for a reasonable CLP language (that is, the so-called \satisfaction-completeness" and \solution-compactness" conditions). The CLP scheme JL87] de nes a theoretical operational semantics for this theory such that a ground query s 6 = t succeeds i s and t are not extensionally equivalent. However, in practice we have no terminating algorithm for testing whether two lambda-terms are extensionally equivalent. Thus, given any particular implementation which is sound with respect to this theory, there is some satis able query which cannot be discovered to be satis able, not even by using the standard breadth-rst technique of complete Herbrand-domain logic programming interpreters.
Furthermore, many implementations of CLP languages are incomplete for e ciency reasons. For instance, CLP(R) JMSY92] implements an e cient but incomplete linear equation solver rather than Tarski's complex algorithm for deciding real arithmetic; and many constraint languages operating over nite domains, such as CHIP VH89], implement incomplete algorithms for nite domain constraint satisfaction to avoid exponential time complexity.
To deal with these considerations, we need to develop a theoretical framework, incorporating notions of computability, in which we can study issues of how complete a CLP implementation is. This framework can then be used as a basis for comparing a CLP implementation with its intended theory, or specifying the smaller theory that an incomplete implementation actually implements. This paper is intended to make steps in the direction of such a framework.
In the remainder of this introduction, I present some basic de nitions. In section 2, I de ne a class of recursive functions called \satis ability functions", which formalize the basic step in CLP languages (the analogue of uni cation). I show how operational semantics can be de ned based on satis ability functions, de ne what it means for a structure to \realize" such a function, and give a necessary and su cient, non-logical condition for a satis ability function to be realizable. In section 3, I use satis ability functions as a basis for studying various techniques for characterizing CLP theories with proof systems, and show how the proof systems could be used to prove the soundness and completeness of implementations. In section 4, I present some conclusions and discuss related work. An appendix contains proofs of the characterization theorems given in section 3.
De nitions and Notation
De nition 1.1 A rst order language L is a tuple hF; P; V i, where F is a recursive set of function symbols, each with an associated arity, P is a recursive set of predicate names, each with an associated arity, and V is a recursive set of variable names. We de ne the terms and formulae of L in the standard way.
Let C be a set of predicate names of L, C P(L). Constrs(L; C) is the set of all atomic formulae from L formed using a predicate name from C. We also call these atomic formulae \constraints".
We de ne notions of structure, valuation, satis ability w.r.t. a structure, and model in the standard Tarskian way.
De nition 1.2 A theory is a set of closed (ground) formulae.
Notation: we will use A; B; C; G to stand for formulae, c to stand for a constraint, s; t to stand for terms, ? and to stand for multisets of formulae, and S; T to stand for sets (usually sets of constraints). These are fairly standard in the literature on constraint logic programming. We will also use the following notation:
9 B] = 9x 1 9x n (B) where x 1 ; : : :; x n are all the free variables of B. Where S = fB 1 ; : : :; B n g, we will de ne 9 S] = 9 B 1 & &B n ] We will de ne 8 
Satis ability Functions
The basic step in constraint logic programming interpreters (even incomplete ones) is the step which decides whether a new constraint is consistent with the previously-processed constraints. Every CLP interpreter has an algorithm for doing this for its intended theory; if the algorithm returns \true", the interpreter goes further down the same branch in the search tree, and if it returns \false", the interpreter backtracks 1 .
This section studies the theory of such \satis ability functions", which will be de ned as partial recursive functions from nite sets of constraints to results including \true" and \false". The motivation for doing so is to build a homogeneous theory of CLP systems, whether they use partial or total satis ability functions, and whether those functions map to \true", \false" or some other outcome.
In the rst subsection, I de ne the notion of satis ability function, and show how an operational semantics can be built on the basis of that notion (rather than the notion of constraint theory). In the second subsection, I point out that not all satis ability functions correspond to actual constraint theories which \realize" them, and that these functions' operational semantics thus do not de ne sensible logic programming systems. I give, however, a condition on satis ability functions which is necessary and su cient for realizability. In the nal subsection, I point out that for a given constraint theory, there are either 0 or 1 maximal satis ability functions which are realized by it.
Satis ability Functions and Operational Semantics
De nition 2.1 A satis ability function (in a language L with constraint predicates C) is a partial recursive function whose domain is the set of nite sets of constraints in Constrs(L; C), and whose range is a countable set T of truth values containing at least true and false.
In the sequel, we will not mention the language and set of constraint predicates if they are implicit from the context. This de nition of satis ability function is general enough to capture the behaviour of a wide variety of complete and incomplete implementations. We always interpret a result of false as \unsatis able" and true as \satis able"; but other results, or no result, are also possible. To capture the very well-behaved satis ability functions, we make the following de nition:
De nition 2.2 A strict satis ability function is one which is never unde ned and always returns true or false.
The satis ability function associated with basic Herbrand-domain Prolog, for instance, is strict. 2 Here is a non-strict example.
Example. The basic behaviour of the CLP(R) system JMSY92] on real-number constraints can be characterized with the following satis ability function sat, whose codomain of truth values is ftrue; false; unsureg.
If S contains a subset T consisting of unsatis able, linear constraints, sat(S) returns false. Otherwise, if S contains no non-linear constraints, sat(S) returns true. Otherwise (i.e. S contains non-linear constraints but its linear constraints are satisable), sat(S) returns unsure. The operational semantics de ned from a satis ability function is a function from states to states.
De nition 2.3 A state (of a CLP operational semantics) on (L; C; T ) is either a truth value in T , or a pair hG; Si, where G is a multiset of non-constraint atoms of L and S is a set of constraints of L; C.
In basing an operational semantics on a satis ability function sat, we may want to give a de nition that takes into account the various truth values which can act as results of sat. We must make the following minimum requirements, following Maher Mah93].
De nition 2.4 Given a satis ability function sat whose range is the truth values in T , a binary relation ! between states is an operational transition relation for sat with program P if:
1. Example. Based on the de nition of sat for CLP(R) above, we can characterize an operational semantics for CLP(R) as follows. 3 The transition relation is the least transition relation for (sat; P) having the additional property that:
We have the transition In this operational semantics, even if we are unsure of the satis ability of the resulting set of constraints (if the system of equations is not linear), we go on as if it were satis able. We may wish to say that a goal G is indeterminate if it does not fail, but every fair derivation ends in either false or unsure.
Realizable Satis ability Functions
We would like our operational semantics to de ne sensible logic programming systems. To achieve that goal, we have to put a condition on the satis ability functions we use. The condition is an analogue of Kleene's notion of \realizability", and is best de ned modeltheoretically.
De nition 2.5 An L-structure < realizes a satis ability function sat if:
1. whenever sat(S) ' true, S is <-satis able; and 2. whenever sat(S) ' false, S is not <-satis able. If < realizes sat, we also say that sat implements <.
Not every satis ability function is realizable, not even the strict ones. For instance, if sat maps fp(x)g onto false but fp(x); q(x)g onto true, then it will not have any realizing structure, because any valuation satisfying fp(x); q(x)g will surely satisfy fp(x)g. An operational semantics based on such a satis ability function would give unexpected results.
The realizability of sat can be given an equivalent characterization in terms of the theory associated with sat.
De nition 2.6 sat , the theory associated with sat, is de ned as f9 S] j sat(S) ' trueg f:9 S] j sat(S) ' falseg where 9 S] is the existential closure of the conjunction of the constraints in S.
We have the following property:
Theorem 2.7 sat is realizable i sat is consistent.
Proof. (!) If some < realizes sat, then by the de nitions of realization of sat and satisfaction of a formula, every formula in sat is true in <. sat therefore has < as a model, so it must be consistent. ( ) Let < be a model of sat . By the de nition of satisfaction of a formula, every S such that 9 S] 2 sat is <-satis able, so every S such that sat(S) ' true is <-satis able; similarly, every S such that sat(S) ' false is not <-satis able. But then < realizes sat. 2
A Condition Equivalent to Realizability
The consistency of sat is a necessary and su cient condition for the realizability of sat. However, if we have a precise description or an algorithm for a given sat in hand, it would be useful to have a more direct method of testing whether it is realizable (more direct than translating it into a theory and testing the theory's consistency). The condition called \re-liability" allows us to do this. One interesting aspect of reliability is that it is a somewhat weaker condition than we might expect. First, some technical de nitions.
De nition 2.8 Let S be a set of constraints and let c 2 S. De nition 2.9 Let sat be a satis ability function. A set of constraints S is sat-covered if for all c 2 S, there is a set T Sj c such that sat(T) ' true. A set of constraints S is sat-consistent if there is some substitution such that S is sat-covered.
Basically, the variable sharing classes of S form a partition of S such that no variable is referred to by constraints in any two distinct elements of the partition. A set S is satconsistent if, for some , every element of this partition of S is satis able in any structure realizing sat.
De nition 2.10 A satis ability function sat is reliable if whenever sat(S) ' false, S is not sat-consistent.
For non-reliable satis ability functions, some sets S are considered unsatis able despite the fact that some instance of S can be partitioned into sets which are generalizations of sets considered satis able. This is a situation which does not meet with our intuitions, and indeed the next theorem proves that reliability is a necessary condition for realizability.
Theorem 2.11 If a satis ability function sat is realizable, then it is reliable.
Proof. Assume (toward a contradiction) that sat is realized by some < but not reliable.
By non-reliability, there must be an S and such that sat(S) ' false but S is sat-covered. Let T 1 ; T 2 ; : : :; T n be all the (disjoint) variable sharing classes in S . By the de nition of sat-covering, each T i is a subset of a set T 0 i such that sat(T 0 i ) = true; so since sat is realized by <, there must be some valuation v i satisfying T i in <. But the union v of these valuations must be a valuation satisfying S in <; therefore the valuation v must satisfy S in <. But we had assumed that sat(S) ' false, so the assumption that < realizes sat is contradicted. 2
Reliability is also su cient for realizability, as we will see next.
Theorem 2.12 If a satis ability function sat is reliable, then it is realizable. Proof. By Theorem 2.7, it is su cient to prove that if sat is reliable, sat is consistent.
Assume that sat is reliable. By compactness, it is su cient to prove that every nite subset of sat has a model.
Let S be a nite subset of sat , where S = f9 S 1 ]; : : :; 9 S m ]g f:9 T 1 ]; : : :; :9 T n ]g Let < be the minimal structure which contains a unique element e i;k for each free variable in each S i , and in which each S i is satis able by a valuation mapping variables to these elements. (It is left to the reader to construct the structure < with these properties.) Clearly this structure is a model of the positive formulae in !S; we have only to prove that it is a model of the negated formulae too. Assume, toward a contradiction, that some T j is satis ed by some valuation v in <. There is some and v 0 such that v = v 0 , v 0 maps free variables directly to elements e i;k of the domain of <, and T j is satis ed by v 0 . But by the construction and minimality of <, this means that each variable sharing class of T j is a free-variable variant of a subset of some S i ; thus there is some 0 such that each variable sharing class of T j 0 is a subset of some S i . T j is therefore sat-consistent. But by the construction of sat , we know that sat(T j ) ' false, thus contradicting our initial assumption that sat was reliable.
Therefore no T j can be satis ed by any valuation in <; < is therefore a model of S, and therefore a model of sat ; thus sat is consistent. 2
Reliability is a necessary and su cient condition for satis ability, but various conditions which appear at rst glance to be equivalent are in fact not. Consider the following two conditions:
C1. If sat(S) ' false, then for every superset T of S, sat(T) ' false. C2. If sat(S) ' false, then for every substitution , sat(T ) ' false. C1-C2 together seem to be a strong condition, but in fact are incomparable to reliability. An example of a satis ability function which meets C1-C2 but is not reliable is the minimal satis ability function which maps S = fp(x); q(y)g to false, every superset of S to false, every set S to false, but maps fp(3)g and fq(4)g to true. A satis ability function which is reliable but does not meet C1-C2 is any one that maps one set with a free variable to false and all other sets to unsure. Now let us add a third condition: C3. If sat(S) ' false, then for every variable sharing class T of S, sat(T) ' false. C1-C3 together imply reliability now, and in fact are properties we might reasonably expect of a satis ability function in an implementation of a CLP language. But they are stronger than necessary, as shown by the second example function in the last paragraph.
Maximality Results
Finally, some words about maximality. Given a particular constraint theory, what is the \biggest" satis ability function which implements it? It turns out that either a theory has a unique, maximal, strict satis ability function, or else there is no maximal satis ability function which implements it.
De nition 2.13 For two satis ability functions sat 1 and sat 2 , we say that sat 1 v sat 2 if:
1. Whenever sat 1 (S) ' true we have that sat 2 (S) ' true; and 2. Whenever sat 1 (S) ' false we have that sat 2 (S) ' false. A satis ability function sat is a maximal implementation of < if it implements <, and there is no sat 0 which implements < such that sat 0 6 = sat and sat v sat 0 .
Theorem 2.14 A structure < has either 0 or 1 maximal implementations.
Proof. Consider the set of all nite, <-satis able sets of constraints. If this set is recursive, then clearly there is a unique, strict, maximal implementation of <. Otherwise, for any sat which implements <, there is either a nite, <-satis able set S of constraints such that sat(S) " or sat(S) 6 2 ftrue; falseg, or a nite, non-<-satis able set S of constraints such that sat(S) " or sat(S) 6 2 ftrue; falseg. In the rst case, let sat 0 be the satis ability function such that sat 0 (S) ' true and sat 0 (T) ' sat(T) for all T not identical to S such that sat(T) #. Then sat v sat 0 . The second case is analogous. Thus from any sat which implements <, we can build a \bigger" sat 0 which also implements <; so there can be no maximal implementation of <. 2 Thus for the example structure given in the Introduction (extensional non-equivalence of lambda expressions), there is no maximal implementation. Whenever we have a satis ability function (and thus a constraint logic programming system) which implements this structure, we can always do better.
Speci cation and Characterization with Proof Systems
We have seen that incomplete implementations of CLP languages are sometimes desirable or even necessary. We have also seen that such incomplete implementations can be given a coherent theoretical basis. But in order to make practical use of incomplete implementations, we need to be able to compare them directly with descriptions of theories.
To do so, we really need formal (syntactic) descriptions of the theories to be compared to; the kinds of informal descriptions found in the literature are sometimes too imprecise to be used in formal proofs, and this imprecision is multiplied when we have several groups of interacting constraints (Herbrand, rational tree, integer, real, etc.). There are at least two other practical reasons for developing formal descriptions of CLP languages:
With increasing prominence of constraint systems, it will become necessary to develop some standard formalismfor describing constraint theories, much as BNF was developed to describe programming language syntax. Syntactic, or more speci cally logical, characterizations of constraint theories will be absolutely necessary to any program-logic system which intends to prove properties of constraint logic programs. One possible framework for such formal descriptions is proof theory, which has been used to good advantage in the past to describe standard Herbrand-domain logic programming HS84, HSH90, MNPS91]. The use of proof theory as a general framework for characterizing CLP, which has not to my knowledge been studied before, is the topic of this section. I will present proof-theoretic characterizations here in the form of sequent calculi, both because they have a clear and natural logical interpretation, and because one of the characterizations involves modal relevance logic, which can be described most easily in a sequent-calculus form. The notion of satis ability function will be used to build very general schemata of characterizing proof systems.
There are two ways in which proof-theoretic characterizations could be used: (a) to specify an intended theory; and (b) to characterize an existing implementation. Examples of (a) would include giving an axiomatization of Horn clauses with Presburger arithmetic, to which we could then compare individual CLP implementations. Examples of (b) would include giving a proof-theoretic characterization of the CLP(R) implementation JMSY92], to see how it looks compared to an axiomatization of real arithmetic. The examples I will discuss here will concern mostly characterizing existing systems, in order to introduce the subject with familiar material.
In this section, I will rst present an enriched syntax of goals and clauses, and an operational semantics based on that syntax. Then I will discuss a simple proof system schema for characterizing CLP systems with strict, Henkin satis ability functions. A theory is \Henkin" if it has a closed \witness" term for every existential truth, and the analogous property of satis ability functions will be shown to be an important issue. I will then discuss a somewhat more complex proof system schema, still characterizing CLP systems with strict satis ability functions, but with the Henkin restriction lifted. Finally, I will discuss a characterization of one important system with a non-strict satis ability function: the simpli ed version of CLP(R) referred to earlier. Notions from substructural logic will be shown to be important here.
Goals, Clauses, and Operational Semantics
We will nd it convenient at this point to slightly expand Maher's framework Mah93] by enriching the syntax of goals and modifying the operational semantics to have more and simpler rules. Here I will present the enriched syntax, and the modi ed operational semantics.
This enriched syntax is based on Miller et al.'s syntax of goals and de nitions for uniformproof-based logic programming systems MNPS91]. Goals:
G ::= c j A j G&G j 9xG where c is a constraint and A is any predicate application formula (atom).
Clauses (de nitions): D ::= p(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) G j 8xD We say that a program is a set of ground clauses. We assume that there is at least one satis able constraint >; what would be an atom in a Prolog program would be a clause with body >. (This is a reasonable assumption for all practical purposes.)
The expanded syntax of goals and de nitions allows us to modify Maher's operational semantics, to describe the actions associated with di erent forms of goals. This will have the e ect of simplifying the individual rules and facilitating the proofs of characterization.
De nition 3.1 The operational semantics OS P;sat for a given realizable satis ability function sat and program P is given by the ) P;sat relation between states, de ned as follows. (? is a multiset of goals, and S is a set of constraints. (G; ?) stands for the multiset union of fGg and ?.)
Con 
Systems with Strict, Henkin Satis ability Functions
Strict satis ability functions have pleasant properties which we can exploit to provide simple, general proof-theoretic characterizations of the systems they are based on. Satis ability functions that also have the \Henkin" property, such as those of Herbrand domain Prolog and Presburger arithmetic, have even simpler characterizations. In this section, I present (with examples and proofs) a proof system schema which characterizes systems with strict, Henkin satis ability functions.
A Henkin theory vD80] is one in which, for every sentence 9xA of the language, there is a constant e in the language such that T j= (9xA) (A x := e]). In analogy with this notion, I give a de nition of a Henkin satis ability function. ?`G (p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) G); ?`p(t 1 ; : : :; t n )
Figure 1: Basic rules B for characterizing a constraint logic programming language. ? is a multiset of formulae.
De nition 3.2 A satis ability function sat is Henkin if, whenever sat(S) ' true, there is a substitution of ground terms for variables such that S is ground and sat(S ) ' true.
Many useful satis ability functions are Henkin; others, such as those for rational trees and real arithmetic, are not. For those satis ability functions which are strict and Henkin, there is a particularly simple characterizing proof system.
Characterizing proof system. De nition 3.3 SH sat is de ned by taking the rules B given in Figure 1 and adding a rule:
Con=r : ?`c for any closed constraint c such that sat(fcg) = true.
The result we will be concerned with about SH sat is that it characterizes OS P;sat in the following sense:
For any closed goal formula G, program P and strict, realizable, Henkin satisability function sat, we have that hG; ;i succeeds with respect to OS P;sat i the sequent P`G is derivable in SH sat . The reason we are interested in this result is, of course, that SH sat is a simple, clear and logical description of the meanings of goals and programs. The rules B in Figure 1 are almost exactly those of Gentzen's original sequent calculus LJ Gen69], and the additional rules ?`c capture the notion of truth according to the satis ability function sat.
I will prove this characterization result in an appendix; here I will just give some examples.
Example: Herbrand-domain logic programming. In the language of this system, the single constraint predicate is =, equality. The function and predicate symbols can be anything, as long as there is at least one nullary function symbol. (Otherwise sat is not Henkin; for instance, fx = xg is true but there is no closed s such that fs = sg is true.) The satis ability function sat is de ned as the one which is true of a set S i there is some substitution such that s is identical to t for all formulae s = t 2 S; that is, sat performs standard uni cation. The characterizing proof system can be given by adding to B the single rule ?`s = s for any closed s, since these constitute the closed true constraint formulae of sat.
The resulting proof system is more or less that given by P`2 = 2 (Con/r) (pred(2; 1) 2 = 2); P`pred(2; 1) ( =l) 8y(pred(2; y) 2 = s(y)); P`pred(2; 1) (8=l) 8x8y(pred(x; y) x = s(y)); P`pred(2; 1) (8=l) P`pred(2; 1) P`2 + 1 = 3 (Dup/l, Con/r) P`pred(2; 1)&2 + 1 = 3 (&=r) P`9y(pred(2; y)&2 + y = 3) (9=r) P`9x9y(pred(x; y)&x + y = 3) (9=r) Example: Presburger arithmetic logic programming. The single constraint predicate is =, equality. The function symbols consist of the nullary 0, the unary s, and the binary +. sat is the function which can be derived from Presburger's algorithm for satisfaction of arithmetic formulae over s and + Mon76]. The characterizing proof system can be given by adding to B the rule ?`c where c is a closed constraint such that sat(fcg) ' true. However, we can give an equivalent proof system which does not depend on a reference to sat by adding to B the rules in Figure 2. These rules are derived from Kleene's Hilbert-style system for Presburger arithmetic Kle52], and the proof that the systems are equivalent can be derived from Kleene's proof of completeness. Note that this proof system (and all the proof systems I discuss here) is quite fragile: the addition of any more rules may require a di erent satis ability function, or may prevent us from having a strict satis ability function altogether. An example of a derivation in SH sat for this satis ability function is given in Figure 3 . Readers are invited to do the corresponding computation in OS sat .
Systems with General, Strict Satis ability Functions
Not all useful satis ability functions (or constraint theories) are Henkin, not even the strict ones. A simple example is the theory of rational trees: we have that 9x(x = f(x)) is true, but there is no closed t such that t = f(t). Another important example is the theory of real arithmetic, in which we have no closed term t such that t t = 2. For these theories, we have to use other methods of characterization. : Additional rules for S sat , a proof-theoretic characterization of a CLP language with a strict satis ability function. S is any set of constraints such that sat(S) ' true, and y is a new variable.
Figure 5: Example derivation in the augmented S sat for rational trees. P is in this case the empty program.
Characterizing proof system. The characterizing proof system schema for strict satisability functions in general allows for the introduction of elements from the theory associated with sat on the left-hand side of the sequent, and allows us to reason about them.
De nition 3.4 Proof system S sat is formed by taking the rules B from Figure 1 and adding the rules in Figure 4 .
This new proof system schema is more complex than SH sat , but does not restrict us to looking at only Henkin satis ability functions. We can prove the same kind of thing about S as we did about SH:
For any closed goal formula G, program P and strict, realizable satis ability function sat, we have that hG; ;i succeeds with respect to ) P;sat i P`G is derivable in S sat .
Again, the rules added are almost exactly those of Gentzen's LJ Gen69] except for the Con/l rules; the Con/l rules capture the notion of satis able set of constraints given by sat.
Example: rational tree logic programming. In this CLP system, the single constraint predicate is =, equality. There are no restrictions on the function symbols. sat is the function which returns true i its set of equations can be reduced to a set of equations in Colmerauer's \solvable form" Col83]. Van Emden and Lloyd vEL84] and Maher Mah88] have given Hilbert-style logical descriptions of the structure which realizes this sat; the fact that this sat is strict follows from Colmerauer's proof that his reduction algorithm terminates Col84].
As in the case for Presburger arithmetic, the unmodi ed proof system S sat may be somewhat clumsy to work with. We can simplify the proof system by adding rules such as ?`t = t where t is any term, and ?`s 1 = t 1 : : : ?`s n = t n ?`f(s 1 ; : : :; s n ) = f(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) where f is any function symbol. It is easy to prove that these are admissible rules of the original system. Figure 5 gives an example derivation of a simple goal in this augmented S sat .
Note that we can in fact restrict the proof system S sat somewhat and still obtain the same soundness and completeness results. If a set of constraints S such that sat(S) ' true contains disjoint variable-sharing classes Sj x and Sj y , then sat(Sj x ) ' sat(Sj y ) ' true, and we can assert 9 Sj x ] and 9 Sj y ] as separate assumptions. Also, if for a set S such that sat(S) ' true we have a substitution mapping variables to closed terms such that sat(S ) ' true, then clearly any derivation that asserts 9 S] could instead assert 9 S ]. Thus we can restrict the side-condition on the assumption introduction rule to where S is a set of constraints such that sat(S) ' true, for all variables x free in S we have Sj x = S, and there is no variable x and closed term t such that sat(S x := t]) ' true.
Non-Strict Satis ability Functions: CLP(R)
We were able to characterize CLP systems with strict satis ability functions with the very general proof system schemata SH sat and S sat via the least operational transition relation for sat. However, CLP systems with non-strict satis ability functions can have many di erent operational semantics; therefore there can be no one proof system schema which characterizes them. In this subsection, therefore, I will discuss a characterization of only one example system, CLP(R), and suggest how the knowledge of this characterization could be applied to other systems. The characterizing proof system for CLP(R) is best described as a modal relevance logic, in that it uses a standard modal operator 2 (\necessitation") and standard relevance logic methods for requiring that assumptions are relevant to conclusions. As such, it is closely related to Girard's linear logic Gir87], although the system which it is closest to is the \calculus of relevance and necessity" R 2 described by Read Rea88] . In this section, I will present the proof system and its use, give a mechanical and a philosophical justi cation for the use of the modal relevance logic framework, and discuss how this result may generalize to other non-strict CLP systems.
Characterizing proof system. The characterizing proof system for CLP(R) is presented in Figure 6 . It is called MR clpr , where clpr is the satis ability function for CLP(R) described earlier in this paper. It is very similar to the S sat schema, since it also uses the idea of introducing the existential closure of a satis able set on the left, and drawing inferences from it. However, there are a few subtle di erences.
1. In the &=r rule, we are allowed to \split" the left-hand side of the conclusion between the left and right premiss. 2. In the 9=r rule, we are required to use a variable, not just any term, as a witness to the existentially quanti ed variable. This variable does not have to be new, however. 3. In the Axiom, the formulae on the left-hand side, other than the constraint which matches the right-hand side, must all be formulae preceded by the necessitation operator 2. 4. There is a new rule, Nec/l, which states that if G can be derived from D and ?, then it can be derived using the stronger assumption that D is necessarily true. The combined e ect of these rules is that any formula appearing on the left without a 2 preceding it must be used, somewhere in the derivation, in an Axiom; that is, all the assumptions must be relevant to the conclusion.
The characterization theorem is also subtly di erent from that of S; note the presence of the 2 operator.
For any closed goal formula G and program P, we have that that hG; ;i succeeds with respect to ) P;clpr i 2P`G is derivable in MR clpr . In the theorem, we use the following notation: Notation 3.5 2P, where P is a set of formulae fB 1 ; : : :; B n g, denotes the set of formulae f2B 1 ; : : :; 2B n g. Thus when we use the proof system, we will always place the clauses of the program on the left-hand side, preceded by the operator which states that each clause is necessarily true. The clauses can then be duplicated, the 2 removed via the Nec/l rule, and then instantiated as before. However, when we strip o the 2, we must eventually use the assumption. Furthermore, all assumptions arising from the use of the Con/l rule must be used as well, since the assumption introduced does not come with a preceding 2.
Example. An example derivation in MR clpr is given in Figure 7 . P, in this example, is the program consisting of the single clause 8z(p(z) z = 2) 2P is therefore 28z(p(z) z = 2) In the derivation, the rst steps (reading up from the bottom) introduce on the left-hand side the satis able set of constraints that we will need to prove the result, and break it down via the 9=l and &=l rules. The next steps instantiate the existential variables on the right to refer to the variables in the satis able set. There is then an &=r step, which splits the list of assumptions so that the precise set of assumptions needed is transferred to each side. On the right-hand branch, there is then a standard sequence of proving a predicate call goal by duplicating and instantiating a clause of the program. Note that the derivation would not have gone through if the query had been simply 9x; y(x y = 4), because we would have had the extra formula y 0 = 4 to contend with. Conversely, if we had allowed axioms to be simply of the form (c; ?`c), we would have been able to prove 9x; y(x y = 4), even though that is not a linear equation and thus not solvable in the operational semantics.
Mechanical justi cation of MR clpr . One way of seeing why a modal relevance logic is required for this system is to look at the mechanics of proving formulae.
The restricted Axiom forces each constraint assumption to be used at least once, as mentioned above. The ability to split the axiom list in the &=r rule is then a necessary adjunct, because if &=r were more like the rule in S sat , we would essentially be required to duplicate every assumption every time we used it; each of the duplicate constraint assumptions would then have to be used. We sometimes do want the ability to duplicate constraint assumptions, however. For instance, if the query is 9x(x = 2&x = 2), we will need to prove it by introducing 9x(x = 2) on the right: x 0 = 2`x 0 = 2 x 0 = 2`x 0 = 2 (Axiom) x 0 = 2; x 0 = 2`x 0 = 2&x 0 = 2 (&=r) x 0 = 2; x 0 = 2`9x(x = 2&x = 2) (9=r)
It is because of this need to duplicate constraint assumptions that relevance logic rather than linear logic is necessary. In linear logic, assumptions without ! (the analogue of 2) not only must be used at least once, they cannot be duplicated (i.e., they must be used exactly once). Here, we want to use non-2 assumptions one or more times, so the Dup/l rule is not restricted as it would be in linear logic.
Finally, although we want constraint assumptions to be used at least once, we want to put no such restriction on the program clauses. In a given query derivation, any given program clause may be used once, more than once, or not at all; we therefore adopt the solution (used by the Lolli system, among others HM94]) of \protecting" the program clauses with 2. The program clauses can then be used 0 or more times, and can end up in Axioms without having been used. I should also mention the mechanical reason for the restriction in the 9=r rule to only variables as witness terms. Without this restriction, we would be able to substitute any term for the variable in the 9=r rule; so for instance, 9x9y(x y = 4) would be easy to prove from the satis able constraint set 2 2 = 4. Because the constraints arising from the expansion of the existential formula must eventually be matched with formulae on the right-hand side, the restriction e ectively means that the witness term must be a variable already appearing on the left-hand side. This forces the Axioms to always have the same form as they would in the computation, correctly forbidding us from substituting satisfying terms that would not be found by CLP(R).
Philosophical justi cation. There is also a more philosophical exegesis of the rules of MR clpr which does not depend merely on showing mechanically how a derivation can or cannot be built. It hinges on the logico-philosophical notions of necessary and contingent fact, relevant implication, and universe of discourse, and explains more fully why MR clpr has a modal relevance logic form.
A necessary fact is one which we take as logically unavoidable, and true in all situations we want to consider. By placing program clauses on the left-hand side of the sequent with the necessitation operator 2 in front of them, we are stating that those clauses are necessarily true, regardless of the particular goal formula we want to prove.
A contingent fact is one which happens to be the case in a particular circumstance, but is not always true. By allowing the introduction of satis able constraint sets on the left without the necessitation operator, we are stating that at any particular time, we are free to assume these sets as contingent facts, but that they are not the case in all circumstances.
By relevant implication from a set of necessary and contingent facts to a conclusion, we mean (following the standard references AB75, Rea88]) a deduction of the conclusion from the facts in which all aspects of all the contingent facts are in some way used to prove the conclusion. The study of relevance logic was initially undertaken in order to disallow dubious implications such as \if the moon is made of green cheese, then 2+2=4" (which are true with the standard \material" implication of classical and intuitionistic logic); the proof systems that have arisen to formalize the notion of relevant implication are all essentially sequentcalculus systems with forms very similar to that of MR clpr .
Finally, when we restrict the 9=r rule to only variables, we are essentially saying that our universe of discourse consists not only of the real numbers, but of a number of other elements which may stand in the equality relation to real numbers or which may be of unknown value. The existential quanti er is taken to range over this set of additional elements, not the real numbers themselves; the constraint sets S such that clpr(S) ' true are taken to state the relationship between the additional elements and the real numbers.
Application to other systems. Are the techniques used to characterize CLP(R) applicable to other systems? Only some properties of the CLP(R) satis ability function, which I have been calling clpr, are needed for the proofs of soundness and completeness, and any system having a satis ability function sat with these properties will su ce. As the name MR clpr implies, we could have MR sat for any such sat.
The properties that clpr has that allow the proofs of soundness and completeness to go through are as follows:
1. clpr always terminates and always returns one of true; false or unsure. 2. clpr(;) ' true. 3. If clpr(S) ' clpr(T) ' true, then if is a substitution which renames variables of T apart from those appearing in S, then clpr(S T ) ' true. This is because the requirement that a set of formulae be linear and solvable is maintained under union of sets with disjoint sets of variables. 4. If clpr(S ) ' true, where is a substitution mapping variables to other variables, then clpr(S) ' true. (For instance, clpr(fx x = 4g) must return unsure because clpr(fx y = 4g) does.) This is the case again because the requirements that a set of formulae be linear and solvable are not a ected by a substitution of one variable by another. While these properties seem reasonable, it is not clear how many useful systems have them. In particular, the fourth property seems problematic; one can easily imagine a satis ability function in which some S is of unsure satis ability, but S x := y] is considered de nitely satis able.
However, it may be su cient to assume that a function which has properties 1-3 is used to determine satis ability during the normal course of computation, but a function with property 4 is used at the end of the computation to determine the satis ability of the nal set of constraints. I have not explored this idea in any detail, since it seems to complicate the theory unnecessarily. The characterization of CLP(R), one of the most important constraint logic programming languages, seems to su ciently motivate the study of MR clpr .
4 Conclusions, Related and Future Work I have shown that the class of satis ability functions adequately characterizes the behaviour of a wide variety of implementations of CLP languages, and that there is a simple, non-modeltheoretic condition (\reliability") for testing whether a satis ability function is reasonable.
I have also discussed techniques for specifying and characterizing CLP systems with sequent calculi. I have pointed out that the question of whether the theory is Henkin is important, and that the notation and proof theory of substructural logics can help in these characterizations.
The de nition of a reliable satis ability function is closely related to Scott's de nition of an information system Sco82]. Saraswat Sar89] uses information systems to describe the domains of constraint systems. However, neither the space of satis ability functions, nor the space of information systems (under a reasonable mapping from one notion to the other), are proper subsets of the other.
H ohfeld and Smolka HS88] and Fr uhwirth Fr u92] have both explored the idea of formally describing constraint theories. H ohfeld and Smolka describe an alternative framework to Ja ar and Lassez's for constraint systems; like Ja ar and Lassez, they do not consider explicitly any computability restrictions on constraint satisfaction algorithms. Fr uhwirth gives a Horn-clause-based language for de ning constraint simpli cation rules, or SiRs, for any given domain. While SiRs have a logical form, they do not necessarily take the form of a simple and intuitive axiomatization or proof system.
There are several directions for future work in this area:
Case studies. I would very much like to see these ideas applied for the purpose of fully and precisely characterizing existing, practical systems. Negation. I have avoided talking about negation in this paper because it poses general problems for logic programming theory which have not been adequately answered yet. A framework which characterizes the failure of constraint queries as well as their success would be desirable. \Ask" constraints. I have considered here only constraints that would be described by Saraswat Sar89] as \tell" constraints. I would also like to characterize \ask" constraints; this may involve allowing some description of implication in characterizing proof systems. (Thanks to Andreas Podelski for interesting discussions on this point.)
Moving toward a standard description language. It would be premature at this point to propose some standard for describing constraint systems, but this would bring many bene ts if done, much as BNF brought a standard manner of describing programming language syntax.
A formula G is meta-derivable from a multiset ? of formulae in SH if there is some SHderivative ? 0 of ? such that ? 0`G is derivable in SH.
Of course, G is meta-derivable from P i P`G is derivable. However, phrasing results in terms of meta-derivabilityrather than derivability will sometimes allow us to prove them using very simple reasoning about the Con/l and 8/l cases. This is the case for the completeness theorem.
Theorem A.3 (Completeness of OS with respect to SH) Let sat be a realizable, strict, Henkin satis ability function. Let G 1 ; : : :; G n be a sequence of goals, S = fc 1 ; : : :; c m g be a set of constraints, and P be a program. If there is some substitution such that G 1 : : :G n and c 1 : : :c n are all meta-derivable from P in SH sat , then there is a T such that h(G 1 ; : : :; G n ); Si ) P;sat h ; Ti and sat(T) ' true.
(Intuition: if G 1 ; : : :; G n are satis able according to the proof system, and so are c 1 ; : : :; c m , then the operational semantics can compute the fact that they are. We are really only interested in the case where n = 1 and S = ;, but we need the more general statement to do the induction.)
Proof. If n = 0, then each c j must be a closed constraint such that sat(fc j g) ' true (there is no other way they could be meta-derivable). By the reliability and strictness of sat, we must have that sat(S) ' true; we simply choose T to be S.
Otherwise, each G i is meta-derivable from P; that is, there is some derivative i of P such that i`Gi . We proceed by induction on the total size of all the derivations i`Gi . Cases are on the last rule used in the derivation of 1`G1 . Let ? = G 2 ; : : :; G n . G 1 (G&H), and the last rule application is of the form 1`G 1`H 1`( G&H) From the & rule of the operational semantics, we know that h((G&H ); ?); Si ) P;sat h(G; H; ?); S)i; but by the induction hypothesis, we know that for some T, h(G; H; ?); Si ) P;sat h ; Ti. G 1 9xG, and the last rule application is of the form
We choose some y not free in any G i or c j . From the 9 rule of the operational semantics, we know that h(9xG; ?); Si ) P;sat h(G x := y]; ?); Si. But then G x := y], the ? formulae, and the S formulae are all meta-derivable from P under the substitution y := t] , so by the induction hypothesis, there is a T such that h(G x := y]; ?); Si ) P;sat h ; Ti. G 1 is a constraint, and the last rule used is Con/r: G 1 must be a closed constraint on which sat returns true. Since c 1 : : :c m are also such constraints, and sat is realizable and strict, we know that sat(fc 1 ; : : :; c m ; G 1 g) ' true. By the Con rule of the operational semantics, we know that h(G 1 ; ?); Si ) P;sat h?; S fG 1 g)i; but then by the induction hypothesis, we know that there is a T such that h?; S fG 1 g)i ) P;sat h ; Ti. The last rule used is either 8/l or Dup/l: the left-hand side of the upper sequent is also a derivative of P, so the result follows directly from the induction hypothesis. G 1 is some atom p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ), and the last rule is of the form 1`G (p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) G ); 1`p (t 1 ; : : :; t n ) By the Def rule of the operational semantics, we know that h(p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ); ?); Si ) P;sat h(G; ?); Si; but from the induction hypothesis, we know that there is a T such that h(G; ?); Si ) P;sat h ; Ti. 2
The summary of these generalized theorems is as follows.
Corollary A.4 (SH characterizes strict, Henkin systems) For any closed goal formula G, program P and realizable, strict, Henkin satis ability function sat, we have that hG; ;i succeeds with respect to ) P;sat i P`G is derivable in SH sat .
Proof. (!) An instance of Theorem A.1, with S = ; and n = 1. Since G is closed, if the substitution mentioned in the theorem exists, then G succeeds by itself. ( ) An instance of Theorem A.3, with n = 1, S = ;, and as the empty substitution. 2 SH sat can therefore be said to be a sound and complete proof-theoretic characterization of the operational semantics for the CLP system corresponding to sat.
A.2 S Characterizes Strict Systems
The proof plan here will be the same: prove soundness of OS sat with respect to S sat , then completeness. The details, however, are slightly di erent.
Theorem A.5 (Soundness of OS with respect to S) Let sat be a realizable, strict satis ability function. Let S = fc 1 ; : : :; c m g be a set of constraints. If h(G 1 ; : : :; G n ); Si ) P;sat h ; Ti and sat(T) ' true, then T; P`B in S sat for all B in G 1 ; : : :; G n ; c 1 ; : : :; c m .
Proof. By induction on the number of steps in the computation. 0 steps: n must be 0, and S = T. Therefore all the elements of S must be derivable directly by using the Axiom rule. > 0 steps: by cases on the rst rule used in the computation. Let ? be the formulae G 2 ; : : :; G n . { h(c; ?); Si ) P;sat h?; S fcg)i: directly from the induction hypothesis. { h(G&H; ?); Si ) P;sat h(G; H; ?); Si: From the induction hypothesis, we have that T; P`G and T; P`H; thus by using the & rule of B, we have that T; P`(G&H). In this and all subsequent cases, the fact that the ? and S formulae are derivable carries over directly from the induction hypothesis. { h(9xG; ?); Si ) P;sat h(G x := y]; ?); Si: From the induction hypothesis, we know that T; P`G x := y]. By the 9 rule of B, we have that T; P`(9xG).
{ h(A 0 ; ?); Si ) P;sat h(G 0 0 ; ?); Si: From the induction hypothesis, we have that T; P`G 0 0 . We therefore have the following derivation:
T; P`G 0 0 (A G 0 ) 0 ; T; P`A 0 ( /l) (8x n (A G 0 )) 0 ; T; P`A 0 (8/l) . . . 8x 1 8x n (A G 0 ); T; P`A 0 (8/l) T; P`A 0 (dupl/l) But A 0 is just G 1 , so T; P`G 1 . 2
To prove the completeness of OS sat with respect to S, we need to expand our de nition of derivative and meta-derivability.
De nition A.6 A multiset of formulae ? 0 is an S-derivative of a multiset ? if ?`G can be derived from ? 0`G by a sequence of applications of the S rules Dup/l, 8/l, Con/l, 9/l, and &/l: ? 0`G . . . ?`G A formula G is meta-derivable from a multiset ? of formulae in S if there is some Sderivative ? 0 of ? such that ? 0`G is derivable in S.
Theorem A.7 (Completeness of OS with respect to S) Let sat be a realizable, strict satis ability function. Assume that G 1 ; : : :; G n are a sequence of goals and S = fc 1 ; : : :; c m g are a set of constraints. Assume further that there is a substitution and set T S of constraints such that sat(T) ' true, and G 1 : : :G n are all meta-derivable from (T; P) in S sat . Then there is some set T 0 of constraints such that sat(T 0 ) ' true and h(G 1 ; : : :; G n ); Si ) P;sat h ; T 0 i.
Proof. Because sat(T) ' true; S T, and sat is strict, we know that sat(S) ' true. If n = 0, we choose T 0 to be S and we have the result (the computation takes 0 steps).
Otherwise, for each G i there is a derivative i of (T; P) such that i`Gi is derivable in S. We prove the result by induction on the total size of all these derivations. Cases are on the last rule used in the derivation of 1`G1 . Let ? be G 2 ; : : :; G n . G 1 (G&H), and the last step in the derivation of G 1 is of the form 1`G 1`H 1`( G&H) Thus G and H are both meta-derivable from (T; P). By the & rule of the operational semantics, h((G&H ); ?); Si ) P;sat h(G; H; ?); Si; but by the induction hypothesis, there is a T 0 such that h(G; H; ?); Si ) P;sat h ; T 0 i. G 1 9xG, and the last step of the derivation of G 1 is of the form 1`( G x := t]) 1`( 9xG) Thus G x := t] is meta-derivable from (T; P). We choose x 0 to be a new variable; then, by the 9 rule of the operational semantics, h(9xG; ?); Si ) P;sat h(G x := x 0 ]; ?); Si. But the substitution x 0 := t] is such that B x 0 := t] is meta-derivable from (T; P) in S sat for all B in G x := x 0 ]; ?. We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis. We conclude that for some T 0 , h(G x := x 0 ]; ?); Si ) P;sat h ; T 0 i.
